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Epistemic Emotions: a natural Kind?
Anne Meylan
Abstract: The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phe-
nomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also 
phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epis-
temic emotions” in fact constitute a unified kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic 
emotions”. obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic 
emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, first, as an emotion, and, second, 
as an epistemic one. The paper is structured accordingly. The first part is devoted to the 
question whether the aforementioned affective phenomena really are emotions, while the 
second part bears on their hypothetical common epistemicity.
1. Introduction
Emotions are affective mental states of a specific sort. They are to be dis-
tinguished, on the one hand, from non-affective mental states, that is, from 
mental states that do not call for our ability to undergo felt experiences such 
as beliefs and judgements.1 on the other hand, emotions must also be dif-
ferentiated from other sorts of affective mental states, from states like moods, 
sentiments, and so on. (I say more about these other kinds of affective mental 
states below.)
Moreover, emotions subdivide into various kinds: the kind constituted by 
moral emotions, the kind constituted by aesthetic emotions, etc… The present 
article scrutinizes the alleged unity of one of these kinds: the kind constituted 
by the so-called “epistemic emotions”.
 1 What is assumed here and throughout the paper is, first, that there exist (at least) three catego-
ries of mental states: cognitive states (beliefs, judgments, etc.), conative states (desires, wants, etc.), 
and affective states. It is also presupposed that emotions belong to the third category. That is to say, 
a second assumption of the present paper is that emotions are not reducible to beliefs, desires, or 
complexes of these.
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Each of the items on lists 1 and 22 have at one time or another been labelled 
epistemic emotions by either philosophers or psychologists:3
To our knowledge, none of the various studies devoted to one or another 
of these alleged epistemic emotions explicitly discusses the boundaries of this 
kind of emotion.4 And yet, that the elements of these two lists can be con-
ceived as a unified kind does not strike us as obvious. What does the feeling 
of knowing share with interest? Is there really a common element in surprise 
and trust?
The general aim of this article is to consider whether the various affective 
phenomena included in the two lists above actually constitute a unified kind, 
i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. obviously, for an affective 
phenomenon to belong to such a kind, it has to meet two conditions: it has to 
qualify, first, as an emotion, and, second, as an epistemic emotion. The paper 
is structured accordingly. Section 2 is devoted to the question whether the 
elements of lists 1 and 2 really are emotions, while section 3 considers their 
hypothetical common epistemicity.
 2 neither of these two lists is meant to be exhaustive. See Dokic (2012) for other epistemic feel-
ings that might be added to list 2. As for list 1, it enumerates four mental phenomena that have explic-
itly been considered to be epistemic emotions. For a broad ranging discussion of epistemic feelings 
see Arango-Muñoz & Michaelian’s introduction to the focus section.
 3 See Arango-Muñoz (2013), Bain (1865), de Sousa (2008, 2011), Dokic (2012), Jones (1996), 
Morton (2010), Scheffler (1991). More precisely, the mental phenomena mentioned in list 2 have 
usually been called “epistemic feelings” rather than “epistemic emotions”. But authors often seem 
to take “epistemic emotions” and “epistemic feelings” to be synonymous, and no clear-cut concep-
tual distinction is made between them. one goal of the present paper is precisely to draw such a 
distinction.
 4 The greater part of the literature devoted to epistemic emotions consists of particular case 
studies — i.e., studies of particular epistemic emotions. See, for instance, the literature devoted to 
curiosity (loewenstein 1994), the feeling of knowing (Arango-Muñoz 2013, Koriat 2000, Mangan 
2000, Ravett Brown 2000), interest (Clément & Dukes 2013, langsdorf et al. 1983, Izard 1972, Silvia 
2006), surprise (lorini & Castelfranchi 2007, Reizenstein 2000), and the feeling of familiarity (Pach-
erie 2008).
List 1
Curiosity
Interest
Surprise
Trust
List 2
Feeling of knowing
Feeling of familiarity
Feeling of forgetting
Tip of the tongue feeling
Feeling of certainty
Feeling of doubt
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2. Are “epistemic emotions” emotions?
The first part of this article aims at identifying the authentic emotions in the 
two lists above. As we will see, most of the aforementioned mental phenomena 
do not in fact qualify as emotions.
2.1. Some essential features of the emotions
The philosophical literature on the emotions is vast. numerous opposing con-
ceptions of emotions are available. Emotions have been identified with many 
things, ranging from complexes of beliefs and desires, to perceptions of values, 
to sophisticated bodily feelings. Beyond these disagreements, emotions and emo-
tional episodes have collectively5 been attributed (at least) five essential features.6
Feature 1: felt character
Episodes of emotions are felt. Most of the worries this claim might raise can 
be dispelled once it is clear that what it means is only that, whenever someone 
experiences an emotion, he feels something, or that there is something felt ev-
ery time one undergoes an emotional episode.7 This is certainly a commonsen-
sical claim. We would not say of someone who never feels the slightest negative 
feeling during, for example, an awards ceremony that he actually went through 
an episode of anger during the ceremony. of course, there are unconscious 
emotions in the sense that you can go through an emotional episode without 
noticing it. But you cannot experience an emotion without feeling it.8
Their felt character distinguishes emotions from phenomena that are not 
actually felt but are rather dispositions to feel, phenomena like character traits, 
moods and perhaps sentiments.9
 5 These are, to my knowledge, widely accepted features of the emotions, which are individually 
necessary but not collectively sufficient. Some readers may complain that the list is incomplete. They 
might, for instance, insist that emotions necessarily help us to achieve fundamental survival-related 
tasks. This might be true. The reason why I am content with these five features is that they are suf-
ficient to give some order to the category of the epistemic emotions.
 6 In the following sections, I am very much indebted to Deonna and Teroni (2012) and Roberts 
(2003).
 7 Most researchers agree that emotions have a felt character in this weak sense. Where philoso-
phers and psychologists disagree concerns the nature of this feeling: is the feeling a constituent of the 
emotion? Does it rather consist in a higher-order state directed at this emotion?
 8 A stronger claim would be to say that whenever someone experiences an emotion of a certain type, 
he feels something specific to that type of emotion. I do not mean anything like this stronger claim here.
 9 love and sadness, for instance, are sentiments, that is, dispositions to feel things. See Deonna 
and Teroni (2012). “love” only rarely refers to an actual feeling (the feeling, for instance, that one has 
when one falls in love). “love” is more often used to denote a sentiment, that is, an affective disposi-
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What makes this point difficult to see is that the names of many emotions 
are ambiguous between two interpretations: the dispositional and the actual 
interpretation. Take “sadness”. Saying that Manfred is sad can be interpreted in 
two ways. According to the dispositional interpretation, it means that Manfred 
has a certain disposition to feel, that of being sad, which is susceptible to mani-
fest itself in various ways. According to the actual interpretation, “Manfred is 
sad” means that Manfred currently experiences a certain emotion, the emotion 
of sadness. Clearly, to experience the emotion of sadness is one way (probably 
the main way) according to which the disposition consisting in being sad is 
susceptible to manifest itself. But it is not the only one.10 When I am sad (in the 
dispositional sense) I am also disposed to feel melancholy, wistful, etc. one of 
the most crucial lines of division in the vast realm of the affective mental states 
is thus that distinguishing actual feelings from dispositions to feel, i.e., from 
affective dispositions. As I said above, because emotions are felt, they are not 
affective dispositions.
Feature 2: physiology
Episodes of emotions go along with physiological changes, mainly but not 
exclusively changes in facial expression. Shame and anger are good examples 
of this fact. These physiological changes are often felt as well – you feel your 
cheeks blushing when ashamed, your blood boiling when angry, etc. – but 
importantly the feeling of an emotional episode is not necessarily exhausted 
by the feeling of the specific physiological change that goes with it. My feeling 
angry does not consist exclusively in my feeling my blood boiling even if the 
latter is certainly part of this feeling.11
Feature 3: valence
Each emotion (or each emotional episode) has either a positive or a negative 
valence, depending on whether it is felt as pleasant or unpleasant.12 happiness, 
hope, relief, etc. contrast with shame, fear, anger, and the like: the former have 
positive while the latter have negative valence.
tion to feel various things – jealousy, happiness, etc. As we will see in detail below, love is, in this 
respect, analogous to interest and trust. 
 10 Affective dispositions (like love and sadness) that are susceptible to manifest themselves in vari-
ous ways are called “multi-track” by Deonna & Teroni (2012).
 11 The thesis that emotions go together with physiological changes is generally associated with the 
name of William James (1884). See, e.g., Damasio (2000) and Prinz (2004) for contemporary develop-
ments of this view. 
 12 one (not unproblematic) way of capturing the valence of emotions is in terms of hedonic tone. 
More precisely, the idea is the following: the feeling accompanying negative emotions is unpleasant 
while the feeling accompanying positive emotions is pleasant.
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Feature 4: twofold intentionality
Emotions (in contrast to other affective phenomena, like, for instance, 
moods) are intentional mental states in the sense that emotions, like beliefs 
and desires, are directed at objects. What is specific to emotions is that they are 
directed at two distinct objects: a particular object and an evaluative property 
not only are episodes of fear, shame, pride, etc., directed at particular objects 
(e.g., Jeanne is afraid of a dog, Paul is ashamed of his lie, henri is proud of his 
action), whenever one experiences a certain emotion, the object of this emo-
tion is, moreover, presented with a certain evaluative property. When Jeanne is 
afraid of a dog, the dog is presented to her as dangerous, when Paul is ashamed 
of his action, his action is presented to him as shameful, when henri is proud 
of his action, his action is presented to him as prideful.13
Evaluative properties are properties like being elegant, beautiful, fruitful, 
beneficial, disgusting, unjust, promising, unacceptable, ugly, annoying, etc. 
What makes the exemplification of an evaluative property something specific 
is the following: for a thing to exemplify an evaluative property is for it to be 
good or bad in some respect. Evaluative properties are thus to be contrasted 
with properties like being blue, square, long, small, dense, etc., which do not 
imply anything as regards to the goodness or the badness of the things which 
exemplify them.14
I have said that whenever one experiences a certain emotion, the object 
of this emotion is presented along with a certain evaluative property. This 
means that whenever someone experiences a certain emotion, the object of 
this emotion is presented to him as being good or bad in some respect. More 
concretely, when Peter is ashamed of his lie, a particular object, i.e., his lie, 
is presented to him as shameful (bad with respect to morality). When I am 
afraid of leaving my children with the young babysitter, this situation (my 
children being alone with the young babysitter) is presented to me as dan-
gerous. When gloria is proud of her action, her action is presented to her as 
worthy of pride. Shamefulness, dangerousness and worthiness of pride are all 
evaluative properties.
The claim that whenever I experience an emotion about something – e.g., 
whenever I am ashamed about my behaviour – the object of this emotion is 
presented to me as exemplifying a certain evaluative property – e.g., my be-
haviour is presented to me as shameful – has led to a distinction between two 
 13 This paper takes for granted the view that emotions are characterized by this specific form of 
intentionality. This should not be problematic since the view in question is very broadly accepted 
in the philosophical literature, see, e.g., Deonna & Teroni (2012), de Sousa (1987), Mulligan (2009), 
Roberts (2003), Tappolet (2000).
 14 See Thomson (2008).
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intentional objects for the emotions:15 the particular object of the emotion 
(Peter’s lie, my children’s situation, gloria’s action) and the formal object (the 
shamefulness, dangerousness, worthiness of pride). Whenever a subject expe-
riences an emotion, his emotion is about a particular object but this particular 
object is also presented to him as exemplifying an evaluative property (the 
formal object of this emotion).
Feature 5: two main standards of evaluation
Episodes of emotions may be evaluated according to various standards. 
First, episodes of emotions are either correct or incorrect. The correctness of 
each emotional episode depends on whether its formal object is actually exem-
plified. More concretely, when Charlotte is afraid of James’s dog, James’s dog 
is presented to her as being dangerous and Charlotte’s fear is correct if James’s 
dog really is dangerous. When Peter is ashamed of his behaviour, his shame is 
correct if his action really is shameful.
note that the fact that emotions are either correct or incorrect follows from 
their being mental states characterized by a specific form of intentionality. It 
follows from the fact that whenever one experiences an emotion, one is present-
ed with something as being the case (feature 4 above). Emotions, like beliefs, 
present things and are thus capable of being correct or incorrect (depending on 
whether what they present is really the case or not).
Besides being correct or incorrect, emotions can also be assessed with re-
gard to their justification. There are justified and unjustified emotions. To bet-
ter see that these two ways (correctness vs. justification) of assessing emotions 
are independent, consider the following example:
Ben, an eight year-old boy, is expecting the visit of his uncle Jimmy. unfortunately 
for Ben, Jimmy decided to bring Stella, his basset, with him. At the sight of Stella, Ben is 
seized by an overwhelming fear. his parents have taught Ben all his life that dogs should 
never be approached no matter how harmless they look. They have also told Ben dread-
ful stories in which young boys have been fatally injured by apparently friendly dogs.
how should we assess Ben’s fear? It is incorrect, since Jimmy’s dog is not 
dangerous. At the same time, Ben’s fear seems justified. Presumably, it is justi-
fied for an eight year-old boy to be scared of dogs when he has had the educa-
tion that Ben has had. Roughly, the justification of an emotion depends – as in 
the case of beliefs – on whether the subject has good reasons for having such or 
such emotion. And Ben, given his age, and given the education he has received, 
has good reason to be scared of his uncle’s dog.
 15 The initial distinction between the particular, or material, objects and the formal objects of 
emotions goes back to Kenny (1963).
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not only emotions (and beliefs), but also desires are, according to cer-
tain theories,16 susceptible of assessment in terms of their correctness. More 
precisely, if to desire something implies that the thing in question is pre-
sented or perceived as good, desires are perfectly analogous to emotions as 
far as their standard of correctness is concerned. According to this view, 
Charlotte’s desiring that James keeps his dog on a lead implies that she is 
presented with this situation as being good (for her safety, perhaps), and 
Charlotte’s desire is correct if James keeping his dog on lead really is a good 
thing (in this regard).
Moreover not only emotions (and beliefs) but also desires seem capable of 
being justified or unjustified. Justified desires would be desires that a person 
has good reasons to have (given what they believe and want beside this).
nevertheless, there is (at least) one standard of evaluation that applies to 
desires but not to emotions. Desires can be satisfied or unsatisfied. Emotions 
(and beliefs) cannot. In contrast to particular desires, it does not make sense to 
say that such and such particular emotion is satisfied.
To recap, desires are capable of being assessed in terms of their correctness, 
their justification, and their satisfaction, while only the two former standards 
of evaluation are relevant as far as emotions are concerned.
2.2. Sorting out the genuine emotions
In the following sections (2.2 to 2.2.5), I make use of this short presentation 
of some of the essential features of the emotions in order to assess whether the 
so-called “epistemic emotions” mentioned in the two lists above do not in fact 
qualify as such.
2.2.1. Epistemic feelings
The clearest upshot of this strategy is the following: none of the phenomena 
enumerated in list 2 are genuine emotions. The reason why this is so is quite 
simple: neither the feeling of knowledge, nor the feeling of forgetting, nor any 
of the remaining feelings listed there implies that the subject is presented with 
an evaluative property. none of the phenomena enumerated in list 2 are char-
acterized by feature 4. Whenever you feel that you know, that you forget, etc., 
your experience is directed at something, probably one of your own mental 
states. But that your mental state exemplifies an evaluative property is defi-
nitely not a part of these experiences. When you feel, e.g., that you know, you 
 16 See, for instance, oddie (2005). Thanks to olivier Massin for having helped me to see this point.
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are presented with something (you knowing something) but this thing is not 
also presented to you as exemplifying an evaluative property.
This does not make the feelings enumerated in list 2 any less worthy of at-
tention. These feelings seem to have in common that they are directed at cog-
nitive mental states – the state of knowing, of remembering, of believing with 
a high or low level of confidence, etc. – and this is sufficient to make them a 
specific kind of feeling, which deserves to be studied for its own sake. The very 
modest goal of this section is, however, to insist that the noetic feelings (as they 
are sometimes called)17 should no longer be considered to be emotions, since 
they do not share one of the essential features of emotions.
As for list 1, whether or not each of the elements of the list (curiosity, inter-
est, surprise, trust) belongs to the category of the emotions requires individual 
consideration. This is what I set out to do below. let me make clear here that 
the following sections (2.2.2 to 2.2.5) do not in the least pretend to settle the 
nature of each of the phenomena included in list 1. Their purpose is mainly to 
cast light on what seems to be the relevant characteristics of each of them as far 
as their standing as a genuine emotion is concerned.
2.2.2. Curiosity
like emotions, curiosity is an intentional phenomenon. Curiosity is directed 
at objects. I am curious to know whether my brother appreciated his trip to 
greece. I am curious about the winner of the last election. Moreover, curiosity 
embodies many of the other essential features of the emotions listed above: it 
is felt (even if “curiosity” can also be interpreted as referring to a disposition 
to feel18), it would not be surprising that it goes together with physiological 
changes and it has positive valence. But is curiosity an emotion?19 I see two 
reasons to think that this is not the case.
The first reason relies on the emotions’ specific form of intentionality (fea-
ture 4). We have seen that whenever one experiences an emotion, a particular 
object is presented as exemplifying a certain evaluative property, which is the 
formal object of this emotion. Whenever one experiences shame with respect 
to an object, this object is presented as shameful.
The analogous reasoning with respect to curiosity would be the following: 
whenever one experiences curiosity, a particular object (a particular question or 
 17 See Dokic (2012).
 18 “Curiosity” is ambiguous. It also refers to an affective disposition, more precisely, a character trait.
 19 To my knowledge, only Morton (2010) take curiosity to be an epistemic emotion. De Sousa 
(2008) and Brady (2009) regard it as an epistemic feeling, but curiosity is most often considered to be 
a desire in the philosophical literature. See note 20 below.
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topic) is presented as exemplifying the corresponding evaluative property, i.e., 
worthiness of curiosity or interest. But is this really what typically happens when 
one undergoes curiosity? It does not seem so. When one experience curiosity 
what typically happens is that one desires to know, understand, or believe true 
things20 about what one, beside this, takes to be curious or interesting. To be pre-
sented with something as curious or interesting is probably a necessary condition 
(or a necessary part) of our experiencing curiosity. But to feel curiosity about a 
topic does not typically consist in being presented with an object as curious or 
interesting. When one feels curious, what typically happens is that one desires 
to know, believe true things, etc. about what one is already presented as being 
worthy of curiosity.
To express the same idea slightly differently, the first reason why I think 
curiosity does not qualify as an emotion can be summarized along the follow-
ing lines:
1. If curiosity were an emotion, to experience curiosity would 
consist, as for all genuinely emotional experiences (see fea-
ture 4), in being presented with an object (a topic, a ques-
tion) exemplifying the corresponding evaluative property 
(i.e., worthiness of curiosity or interest);
2. Consider what happens when you experience curiosity 
about something and compare this to what happens when 
you experience a genuine emotional episode, e.g., an epi-
sode of shame.
3. When you experience an episode of shame, something is 
presented to you as shameful, and experiencing shame con-
sists in being presented with something in this way.
4. When you experience curiosity about, let us say, a topic, this 
topic might be presented to you as worthy of your curios-
ity, but to experience curiosity does not principally consist 
in that. More generally, being curious about something 
does not consist in being presented with something as be-
ing such or such. The prevailing element of an experience 
of curiosity is the (conscious) desire to know, believe true 
things, etc. about something;
5. Conclusion: to experience curiosity is not like experiencing 
a genuine emotion, for instance shame.
 20 Philosophers disagree on whether to be curious is to desire knowledge, true beliefs, or even 
something else. See Whitecomb (2010) for an overview of this debate.
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If the previous reasoning does not convince you, here is a second (and stron-
ger) reason not to class curiosity in the category of the emotions: curiosity 
can be satisfied or unsatisfied. The exact conditions under which curiosity is 
satisfied are subject to a debate in which I do not need to take a stand here. 
The important thing to recall is simply that emotions are not mental states 
that are susceptible of being satisfied or unsatisfied but that desires are. This 
clearly gives us reason to consider curiosity as a specific form of desire rather 
than an emotion. This is, moreover, the prevailing view in the philosophical 
literature.21
2.2.3. Interest 
Suppose Cecile’s main interest since she was ten has been baroque music. 
While she passionately listens to Boccherini’s Stabat Mater and has her at-
tention focussed on the soprano’s voice, she goes through various emotional 
experiences. none of these is an episode of interest. of course, this does 
not mean that Cecile’s interest in baroque music is interrupted during the 
time she listens to Boccherini. The term “interest” is ambiguous between 
two meanings in the way the names of many emotions are. When we say: 
“Cecile’s interest is baroque music” what we mean is that Cecile has a certain 
affective disposition, consisting in being interested in baroque music. It is 
this disposition to feel that Cecile does not loose while she fervently listens 
to Boccherini.
now, the affective disposition of interest can probably manifest itself in vari-
ous ways and sometimes (even if perhaps rarely), this manifestation is a genuine 
emotion of interest. Suppose for instance that, on her way to a conference dedi-
cated to the early baroque, Cecile meets her aunt Claudia and that she explains 
to her aunt where she is going. Surprised, Claudia cannot contain herself and 
asks Cecile what her real reason is for attending such a conference early on a 
Saturday morning. While Cecile answers her aunt by mentioning her early inter-
est in baroque music, she simultaneously experiences a sort of pleasant feeling or 
positive excitement. A plausible way of describing what is happening then is to 
suggest that Cecile feels her interest in baroque music.
If this description is true, there is no reason to refuse Cecile’s feeling at this 
moment the status of a genuine emotional experience. It is positively valenced, 
and probably accompanied by some changes in facial expression.22 It also seems 
directed at two distinct objects in the way emotions are. At the moment Cecile 
 21 See Kvanvig (2003), Foley (1987), Whitecomb (2010), Williamson (2000). 
 22 See Izard et al. (1995). 
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feels her interest, baroque music is presented to her as exemplifying an evaluative 
property, namely, the property of being interesting. Finally, her interest is suscep-
tible to be correct/incorrect (depending on whether baroque music is interesting 
or not) and justified/unjustified (depending on whether Cecile has good reason to 
view baroque music as interesting).
however, Cecile’s interest cannot strictly speaking be satisfied or unsatis-
fied. This is what clearly distinguishes interest from curiosity. Interest and cu-
riosity are certainly closely related. More precisely, a plausible claim is that one 
of the main manifestations of the disposition of interest is the desire to know, 
i.e., curiosity.
To recap, “interest” refers primarily to an affective disposition: the affective 
disposition consisting in being interested in something. This affective dispo-
sition can manifest itself in various ways. occasionally, my being interested 
in something possibly manifests itself in my actually feeling interest for that 
thing. nothing clearly precludes considering this feeling of interest as a genu-
ine emotional experience. If this is so, “interest” is also susceptible (even if 
more rarely) to refer to an emotion, to the emotion one experiences when one 
is presented with something (a topic, an object, a situation) as exemplifying the 
evaluative property consisting in being interesting.23
2.2.4. Surprise
Surprise is another contentious candidate for the title of genuine emotion. 
on the one hand, many emotion specialists mention “surprise” in their cat-
alogue of basic emotions.24 Surprise, indeed, seems to embody many of the 
necessary features listed above. The main problem with surprise is feature 3: 
surprise is not clearly positively or negatively valenced. Surprise is not always 
pleasant or unpleasant.25
one way26 of trying to solve this problem consists in making clear that what 
the claim that every emotion is positively or negatively valenced means is that 
 23 Izard (1992) and Fredrickson (1998) take interest to be an emotion. In contrast, interest is a sim-
ple state, not an affective state, according to ortony & Turner (1990). For an overview of the literature 
on interest, see Silvia (2006).
 24 Interestingly, “surprise” is not ambiguous between a dispositional and an actual interpretation, 
as “curiosity”, “interest”, and (as we will see below) “trust” are.
 25 See ortony and Turner (1990), pp. 316-317.
 26 Another solution would be to give up the model, which I have been assuming so far, of valence 
in terms of hedonic tones (pleasantness and unpleasantness) and to adopt another model which would 
fit surprise better. There are many models, and considering each of them would take me too far afield. 
At first sight, however, my impression is that none of these other ways of capturing the valence of the 
emotions does a better job with respect to the particular case of surprise.
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every particular experience of an emotion is positively or negatively valenced. 
Positive/negative valence is not attached to emotion-types but to particular 
episodes or tokens of emotion-types.27
The problem with this solution is that there seem to be particular episodes 
of surprise that are neither pleasant nor unpleasant, that is, which are neutral 
as regards to their hedonic tone. Even if I have no clear reply to this objection 
yet, let me say a few words about the form that such an answer might take. 
A way out is naturally to reject the allegation according to which episodes of 
surprise are not always either positively or negatively valenced, viz., the claim 
according to which there is no neutral surprise. What I would like to show now 
is that the tendency to think that there are neutral episodes of surprise might 
derive from the tendency to reduce surprise to a purely cognitive phenomenon.
Roughly, the experience of surprise has often been considered to consist 
in a reaction, by a subject, to a realized mismatch between this subject’s 
expectations and what he takes to happen in the world.28 let me call this 
conception of surprise “the purely cognitive model”. now, such a mismatch 
between the subject’s expectations and what he believes to happen can, in-
deed, be pleasantly, unpleasantly, or neutrally experienced depending on the 
expectations themselves. When you expect something to happen, you can 
look forward to the occurrence of this thing, be reluctant toward its occur-
rence, or feel neither inclination nor disinclination toward it. Accordingly, 
the mismatch will be felt as pleasant, unpleasant or neutral and the surprise 
good, bad or … neutral. If there are neutrally felt mismatches, there are neu-
trally felt surprises.
Briefly, the suggestion is the following: what is responsible for emotions 
theorists acceptance of the view that there are neutral episodes of surprise is 
that they adopt a purely cognitive model of surprise in terms of mismatches.
The problem with the purely cognitive model, I will argue now, is that it 
does not appropriately capture what we commonsensically mean when we 
speak of a surprise.
Suppose you press the button on the lift, expect the lift to come, wait a few 
seconds, realize that the lift is not coming, and take the stairs instead. There 
is a mismatch between your expectations and what you believe to be the case 
in the world. But are you “surprised”? I do not think so. As such (i.e., without 
modifying this simple case in any extraordinary ways), speaking of an experi-
ence of “surprise” in such a situation is not to use the term commonsensically. 
When you take the stairs after having waited for the lift to no avail, you would 
 27 See Deonna and Teroni (2012).
 28 See mainly lorini & Castelfranchi (2007), Reizenstein (2000).
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not describe yourself as surprised. And this is true even if I modify the case 
by specifying that the lift has always come when you have pressed the button.
What I am trying to show with the lift case is simply the following: to experi-
ence surprise consists in something more than reacting to a mismatch between 
what one expects to occur and what one takes to occur.
To sum up, my view is that we need to solve the problem raised by the appar-
ent fact that some episodes of surprise are neutrally valenced (neither positively 
nor negatively valenced), since we certainly do not want to exclude surprise 
from the category of the emotions. The solution suggested above takes two 
steps. First, it explains why the claim according to which there are neutrally 
valenced episodes of surprise is the theoretical result of the purely cognitive 
model. Second, it shows that the cognitive model is insufficient to capture sur-
prise by presenting a case in which the mismatch required by the model does 
not coincide with an experience of surprise. If I am right on the first front – i.e., 
if the view that there are neutrally valenced episodes of surprise is in fact im-
plied by the purely cognitive model of surprise – the deficiency of the cognitive 
model is sufficient to cast doubt on the claim that there really are neutral sur-
prises. Thus, there would no longer be any reason to worry about the genuinely 
emotional nature of our episodes of surprise.
2.2.5. Trust
The exact nature of trust is a complicated topic that has been extensively 
debated. In particular, a lot has been said regarding the difference between 
trust and mere reliance.29 The purpose of this section is not to prolong this 
discussion. My goal is rather to focus on the affective nature of trust.30 More 
specifically, I would simply like to emphasize that something analogous to 
what I have stated about interest is true regarding trust: to trust someone is 
much more often to be in a certain affective dispositional state than to actually 
feel trust.
The affective disposition consisting in trusting someone is susceptible to 
manifest itself in various ways. one (but only one) of these consists in feeling 
trust toward this person. Suppose someone is asking you how you can leave 
your children without feeling the slightest anxiety and that you answer: “I 
deeply trust my mother, that’s why”. While you give this reply, your affective 
disposition consisting in trusting your mother as far as your children’s well-
being is concerned may manifest itself in an actual feeling of trust. In this 
 29 See mainly Baier (1986).
 30 The assumption of this paper is indeed that trust is, as Jones (1996) claims, an affective phenom-
enon. like surprise, trust has also been given a purely cognitive description. See gambetta D. (1988).
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case, you would actually feel trust toward your mother. now, this potentially 
occurring (even if rare) feeling of trust seems31 to embody all the essential fea-
tures of the emotions. More interestingly, trust is an intentional phenomenon 
in that it is directed at persons.32 When I feel trust, I experience an emotion 
which presents a person as exemplifying an evaluative property, the property 
of being trustful.
3. Are epistemic emotions “epistemic”?
The previous part of the paper was devoted to considering whether some of 
the so-called “epistemic emotions” (lists 1 and 2) may qualify as genuine emo-
tions and if so under which conditions. As we have just seen, it is not obvious 
that most of them do.
The alleged unity of the phenomena enumerated in lists 1 and 2 (the so-
called epistemic emotions) faces another threat. not only do these phenomena 
not share the same “affective nature” (in that some of them are not emotions) 
but, as I would like to show now, their common epistemicity is dubious as well.
As we have seen above, a specific form of intentionality characterizes emo-
tions in the sense that, whenever someone experiences an emotion, he is pre-
sented with something (i.e., the particular object of his emotion) as exemplify-
ing an evaluative property (the formal object of his emotion). now, the formal 
objects of the emotions also serve to distinguish between kinds of emotions.33 
The general idea is the following:
In order for an emotional episode directed at an object to belong to a certain 
kind K, the subject has to be presented with this object exemplifying an evalu-
ative property of kind K. For instance, Jane’s guilt about her drug addiction 
qualifies as a moral emotion if only if her drug addiction is presented to her as 
exemplifying a moral evaluative property, e.g., wickedness.
 31 The question whether trust is accompanied with specific physiological changes is, to my knowl-
edge, still open.
 32 You might object that we sometimes trust objects, animals or institutions. There are several 
replies to give to this objection. one of them is to insist that trust is not to be confused with mere 
reliance. For a detailed description of the latter distinction, see Baier (1986).
 33 See Deonna and Teroni (2008, 2012), De Sousa (1987), Mulligan (2007, 2009), Tappolet, (2000), 
Teroni (2007). note that there are once again – as for the view according to which each emotion is 
either positively or negatively valenced, see section 2.2.4 above – one strong and one weak way of 
fleshing out the claim according to which each emotion belongs to the kind to which its formal object 
belongs. According to the strong way, each emotion type belongs to the kind to which belongs its 
formal object. The weak interpretation only says that each particular episode of an emotion belongs 
to the kind to which its formal object belongs. In what follows, I only assume that the weak way of 
conceiving the relation between the kinds of emotions and their formal objects.
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There is no reason why this way of proceeding could not be used in order 
to distinguish epistemic emotional episodes from non-epistemic ones. If so, 
the epistemicity of the emotional episodes would be ruled by the following 
standard:
The Formal Object Standard of Epistemicity (FOS)
An emotional episode is epistemic if and only if its formal ob-
ject is an epistemic evaluative property.
The consequence of the adoption of FoS is the following: questioning the 
epistemic unity of the phenomena enumerated in lists 1 and 2 above will actu-
ally amount to questioning the epistemic unity of distinct evaluative proper-
ties. hence, the next pressing question is:
What, if anything, makes the following distinct evaluative 
properties (the surprising, the interesting, the trustful) epis-
temic ones?
A natural way of classifying distinct evaluative properties in the same cat-
egory is to show that they hold a specific relation with a final evaluative prop-
erty of a certain kind, in our case, with the final epistemic evaluative property.
now, one recurring proposal since Plato is that being true is the final epis-
temic evaluative property.34 Are the interesting, the surprising and the trustful 
connected to the true in a way that could explain why they all belong to the 
class of the epistemic evaluative properties?35
This is doubtful.
To see this, we need to note, first, that, among the evaluative properties, 
some are more determinate than others.36 For instance, the property of being 
scarlet is a more determinate property than the property of being red; the 
property of being generous is a more a determinate property than the property 
of being morally good. Just as, for instance, the property of being square is a 
 34 There are other candidates for the title of final epistemic evaluative property, viz., knowledge 
and understanding. See Kvanvig (2003, 2009). At first sight, I do not see any reason to think that 
knowledge or understanding will perform better as regards to the unification of such diverse evalua-
tive properties as the surprising, the interesting, and the trustworthy. 
 35 Another difficulty faced by this proposal is that it is not clear that truth is an evaluative property 
value rather than the bearer of an evaluative property. If truth is not itself an evaluative property but 
something that exemplifies an evaluative property, it cannot of course be identified as the evaluative 
property responsible for the unification of the distinct epistemic evaluative properties.
 36 The same idea is often captured by distinguishing between thick and thin evaluative properties, 
the thinnest evaluative properties being the property of being good (generally, i.e., not in a specific 
respect) and the property of being bad (generally, i.e., not in a specific respect).
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more determinate property than the property of being equilateral, the prop-
erty of being melodious is a way of being aesthetically good.
The second thing to note is that it is common practice to rely on the evalua-
tive property under which a certain determinate evaluative property falls in or-
der to categorize this determinate evaluative property. More concretely, given 
that being generous consists in a way of being morally good, being generous is 
a moral property. given that being melodious consists in a way of being aes-
thetically good, being melodious is an aesthetic property.
With this in mind, let us go back to our initial question: are the interesting, 
the surprising, and the trustworthy connected to the true in a way that could 
explain why they all belong to the class of the epistemic evaluative properties?
The simplest way of answering positively would be by showing that to be 
interesting, to be surprising, and to be trustwrothy constitute specific ways of 
being true. But this is clearly not the case. Clearly, an interesting or a surprising 
claim is not a claim which is true (in some specific respect). Many interesting 
claims are false and sometimes even known to be so. An analogous conclusion 
holds for the property of trustworthiness. For a claim to be trustworthiness is 
not to be true in a specific way.
4. Conclusion
Diverse phenomena (list 1 and 2 above) have been called “epistemic emo-
tions”. The first part of this paper is devoted to pointing to the genuine emo-
tions in these two lists. Its main upshot is that most of these phenomena – 
potential exceptions are surprise, interest, and trust – do not qualify as such. 
Most of them are not eligible as emotions.
The second part of the article asks a general question. Epistemic emotions 
are meant to constitute a specific kind of emotions in the way moral emotions, 
for instance, do. If so, what constitutes their common epistemicity? The ques-
tion leads to difficulties since the apparently plausible suggestion – that it is 
their connection to truth that makes emotions epistemic ones – fails. This, I 
think, is sufficient to cast doubt on the very possibility of delineating an epis-
temic kind of emotions.*
 * The present paper has benefited from the precious comments of Kevin Mulligan and Ronald de 
Sousa. I am also very grateful to the two editors of the focus section for their valuable remarks on an 
earlier version of this text. Thanks also to Christian Budnik for having provided me some very useful 
material on trust.
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